아프리카ㆍ중동

Many intractable civil wars take place in countries with large Muslim population. In these protracted conflicts, Islamists are often just one of many actors fighting in a complex landscape of ethnic, tribal, and political violence. Yet, certain Islamist groups compete
exceptionally well in these conflicts. Why do Islamists sometimes gain power out of civil war stalemates? Although much of the existing research points to either ethnic or religious motivations, this study argues that there are also hard economic reasons behind the rise of Islamist power. This study offers a security market model in
war political economy of Islamist success in civil war that highlights the role of an important, but often-overlooked, class: the local business community.
In this context, the purpose of this study analyses the Islamists interests in Somalia’s Civil War. What causes profitt-driven business elites to support ideologically motivated Islamists? To begin to answer this question, this study models civil war as a market for
security, in which businesses purchase security from substate protection rackets. Within this security market, this study posits that Islamists are uniquely competitive.
Specifically, because they are able to work across ethnic and tribal divisions, Islamists can offer lower prices for providing security than rival groups that rely on a narrower base. These lower prices give Islamists an advantage in courting business support and monopolizing the domestic security market.